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DEBATING EMPLOYEE NON-COMPETES  
AND TRADE SECRETS 
Sharon K. Sandeen† and Elizabeth A. Rowe††  
Recently, a cacophony of concerns have been raised about 
the propriety of noncompetition agreements (NCAs) entered into 
between employers and employees, fueled by media reports of 
agreements which attempt to restrain low-wage and low-skilled 
workers, such as sandwich makers and dog walkers. In the lead-up to 
the passage of the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA), 
public policy arguments in favor of employee mobility were strongly 
advocated by those representing the “California view” on the 
enforceability of NCAs, leading to a special provision of the DTSA 
that limits injunctive relief with respect to employee NCAs. Through 
our lens as trade secret scholars, we enter the fray and present this 
Article to explore both the values and detriments of NCAs, each 
taking sides in the debate and providing relevant information about 
the different approaches to the enforceability of these agreements. 
Finally, we come together to suggest a more nuanced middle-ground 
to encourage courts to engage in a more robust analysis that focuses 
on both the legitimate business interest to be protected by the NCA 
and reasonableness in the scope of the agreement. To that end, we 
recommend consideration of six questions to help guide courts in 
achieving a more equitable and balanced outcome to protect the 
interests of employers and employees.  
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INTRODUCTION 
When businesses wish to restrict others (often employees) from 
working for competitors, they enter into written restrictive covenants 
known as noncompetition agreements or noncompetes (NCAs). 
Recently, a cacophony of concerns has been raised about the 
propriety of NCAs entered into between employers and employees, 
fueled by media reports of agreements which attempt to restrain low-
wage and low-skilled workers, such as sandwich makers and dog 
walkers.1 In the lead-up to the passage of the federal Defend Trade 
Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA), public policy arguments in favor of 
employee mobility were strongly advocated by those representing the 
“California view” on the enforceability of NCAs,2 leading to a special 
provision of the DTSA which limits injunctive relief with respect to 
employee NCAs.3 Most recently, the Obama administration had made 
it a priority to highlight and advocate for greater limitations on the 
enforcement of NCAs in the employment setting.4 
Through our lens as trade secret scholars, we have decided to 
enter the fray and present this article as a discussion of what we 
perceive are the values and detriments of NCAs, with the ultimate 
goal of suggesting a better way for courts (and perhaps, legislators) to 
determine the enforceability of such agreements. Currently, states 
generally follow two diametrically opposed approaches to the 
question of the enforceability of NCAs: (1) the California view 
(followed by a handful of other states) which holds that such 
agreements are unenforceable, with few exceptions; and (2) the 
majority view, which holds that such agreements are enforceable 
unless unreasonable. In between these two poles falls a highly fact-
																																								 																				
 1. See, e.g., Ruth Simon, Litigation Over Noncompete Clauses Is Rising, WALL ST. J. 
(Aug. 14, 2014), http://bit.do/NoncompeteLitigationRising; Sarah Whitten, Jimmy John’s drops 
noncompete clauses following settlement, CNBC (June 22, 2016), 
http://bit.do/JimmyJohnsDropsNoncompete; Dave Jamieson, Doggy Day Care Chain Makes Pet 
Sitters Sign Noncompetes To Protect ‘Trade Secrets’, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 24, 2014), 
http://bit.do/PetSitterNoncompete. 
 2. A California law dating from 1872, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600 (1941), makes 
non-compete agreements void and unenforceable except in very limited circumstances involving 
the sale of a business.  
 3. See letter by Professor Sharon K. Sandeen to Senator Dianne Feinstein (dated Aug. 
28, 2014) (on file with authors); see also ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE (2013).  
 4. See White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: The Obama 
Administration Announces New Steps to Spur Competition In The Labor Market And Accelerate 
Wage Growth (Oct. 25, 2016); White House Office of the Press Secretary, Executive Order – 
Steps To Increase Competition And Better Inform Consumers And Workers To Support 
Continued Growth Of The American Economy (Apr. 15, 2016); White House Office of the Press 
Secretary, State Call to Action On Non-compete Agreements (Oct. 25, 2016). 
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specific analysis that often results in unpredictable and seemingly 
inconsistent rulings.  
While the native Californian among us, Professor Sandeen, 
favors the California view because it provides a bright-line and 
predictable test that focuses attention on the purpose of the restraint, 
she agrees with Professor Rowe that the analysis under the majority 
view ought to be improved. Fortunately, as outlined in this article, the 
common law of restraints of trade, coupled with the definition of 
trade secrets under both the Uniform Trade Secret Act (UTSA) and 
the DTSA, provide the basis for a more improved analysis.   
In Part II, we provide an overview of the current law governing 
NCAs, including a discussion of its common law development and 
the traditional “legitimate business interest” and “reasonable scope” 
requirements of enforceable NCAs. Part III provides a description of 
recent legislative reform efforts. Then, in Parts IV and V, we each 
take a side in the debate, providing relevant information about the 
different views on the enforceability question.  
In discussing the California view in Part IV, Professor Sandeen 
emphasizes the need to keep the question of the enforceability of 
employee NCAs separate from the question of the enforceability of 
nondisclosure and nonsolicitation agreements. Properly tailored 
nondisclosure and nonsolicitation agreements that do not restrict an 
individual from pursuing a trade or profession are acceptable, 
provided they are otherwise reasonable. She then provides some 
rationales for why states, like California, might prefer a bright-line 
test of unenforceability for NCAs.    
In Part V, Professor Rowe presents the other side of the debate, 
setting forth several reasons why appropriately tailored NCAs are 
beneficial. She argues that employee NCAs can be a valuable and 
complementary tool for protecting trade secrets because they can be 
the most effective remedy in some circumstances of trade secret 
misappropriation. Thus, she advocates for a more nuanced and robust 
approach to the enforceability of NCAs that is different from the 
usual binary choice of keeping or banning them. She maintains that to 
the extent there are concerns about some aspects of NCAs, there are 
existing mechanisms to protect the interests of employees, and more 
targeted approaches to addressing specific problems with non-
competes might be a more fruitful focus for both employers and 
employees, rather than the impulsive motivation to ban NCAs 
altogether. 
For those states that follow the majority view, in Part VI, we join 
forces to suggest an analytical framework that courts faced with the 
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enforceability question could use to ensure that NCAs are not used for 
anti-competitive or abusive purposes. The article concludes in Part 
VII.  
I.  BACKGROUND OF THE LAW GOVERNING NON-COMPETES 
The use of NCAs has a long history, dating back over 500 years, 
and debates about the pros and cons of such restraints have persisted 
throughout that time.5 The battle lines are typically drawn between 
those who advocate for freedom of contract and emphasize that the 
restrictions are limited to the contracting parties, and those who see 
the broader societal implications of restrictions placed on trade and 
employee mobility. Due to concerns about restraints of trade, the 
general rule is that NCAs are unenforceable, but as the common law 
developed, it was recognized that they might be acceptable if 
ancillary to a legitimate purpose and “reasonable.” The public policy 
underlying such a rule was succinctly expressed by then-Judge 
Howard Taft in U.S. v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.: 
The objections to such restraints were mainly two. One was that by such 
contracts a man disabled himself from earning a livelihood with the risk of 
becoming a public charge, and deprived the community of the benefit of 
his labor. The other was that such restraints tended to give the covenantee, 
the beneficiary of such restraints, a monopoly of the trade, from which he 
had thus excluded one competitor, and by the same mean might exclude 
others.6 
He also noted the “mischief” and “great abuses” that might arise 
“from corporations perpetually laboring for exclusive advantages in 
trade.”7   
The Restatement (First) of Contracts (first published in 1932) 
details the predominate U.S. law governing restraints of trade in 
sections 512-519. The general rule is that “[a] bargain in restraint of 
trade is illegal if the restraint is unreasonable.”8 Based upon this, most 
states will enforce NCAs if they are shown to be reasonable, differing 
only on such matters as what constitutes reasonableness, the degree 
and type of evidence that is needed, and who has the burden of proof 
																																								 																				
 5. See Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 
626 (1960).  
 6. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 279 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d as 
modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
 7. Id. 
 8. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 513 (1932) RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
CONTRACTS § 513-14 (1932) (“A bargain in restraint of trade is illegal if the restraint is 
unreasonable.”). 
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on the issue on reasonableness.9 Currently, only four states expressly 
prohibit the enforcement of such agreements, except in narrow 
circumstances: California, Louisiana, North Dakota, and Oklahoma.10 
A. The Many Forms of Restraint on Trade 
Restraints of trade can take many forms, and as the cases reveal, 
it is important to distinguish between restraints that prevent an 
individual from pursuing a trade or profession (NCAs) from those 
that proscribe certain discrete behaviors, such as the disclosure or use 
of confidential information or the solicitation of clients. The focus of 
this article is on “true” NCAs and not nondisclosure agreements or 
nonsolicitation agreements that are mislabeled as NCAs (although 
many cases involve multiple types of restraints that need to be sorted 
out). In states like California, where NCAs are unenforceable except 
in very limited circumstances, reasonable and properly tailored 
nondisclosure and nonsolicitation agreements will often be 
enforced.11 The same goes for states where reasonable NCAs are 
enforceable, with the analysis of reasonableness focusing, in part, on 
the purpose for the restraint. As a general rule, the more an individual 
is prevented from pursuing his or her trade or professional calling, the 
more suspect the agreement.    
It is also important to distinguish between restraints that are 
ancillary to an underlying contract and those that are not.12 Pursuant 
to U.S. antitrust law, all “unreasonable” restraints of trade are 
prohibited by the Sherman Act (or analogous state laws) and may be 
subject to an enforcement actions by the U.S. Department of Justice 
or the Federal Trade Commission,13 but restraints that are ancillary to 
a contract entered into for another purpose will generally be analyzed 
under the “rule of reason”14 and often are not challenged on antitrust 
grounds. In contrast, so-called “direct restraints” are more likely to be 
																																								 																				
 9. BRIAN M. MALSBERGER, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY, 
(10th ed., with 2016 supplement); Norman D. Bishara, Fifty Ways to Leave Your Employer: 
Relative Enforcement of Covenant Not to Compete Agreements, Trends, and Implications for 
Employee Mobility Policy, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 751, 757 (2011).  
 10. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600 (2016); LSA-R.S. 23:921 (2015); N.D.C.C. § 9-08-
06 (2016); Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 217 (2016). Other states have statutes governing non-compete 
agreements, but they are not as narrowly drawn. See e.g., C.R.S.A. § 8-2-113 (1982) (Colorado). 
 11. See 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
 12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 187-88 (1981). 
 13. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
 14. Perceptron, Inc. v. Sensor Adaptive Machines, Inc., 221 F.3d 913, 919 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(quoting Lektro–Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 265 (7th Cir.1981)) (“The parties 
agree that the legality of noncompetition covenants ancillary to a legitimate transaction must be 
analyzed under the rule of reason.”). 
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subject to scrutiny under state or federal antitrust laws.15 Judge Taft 
discussed the distinction as follows: 
No conventional restraint of trade can be enforced unless the covenant 
embodying it is merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract, 
and necessary to protect the covenantee in the full enjoyment of the 
legitimate fruits of the contract, or to protect him from the dangers of an 
unjust use of those fruits by the other party.16 
Typically, where NCAs of the ancillary type are allowed, they 
arise in two distinct situations: (1) in conjunction with an arms-length 
business transaction, often concerning the sale of a business or an 
intellectual property license; or (2) as part of an employment 
relationship.17  
As recounted by Professor Harlan Blake in his seminal article on 
the history of NCAs, early case law followed a unitary approach to 
the enforceability of NCAs that did not differentiate between NCAs 
that were entered into in conjunction with a business relationship and 
those that were ancillary to an employment relationship.18 But as 
business and employment practices began to change in the late 1800s, 
there was greater recognition of the need to distinguish the two 
circumstances due to the social benefits of employee mobility and 
because the purposes of the two types of restraints are fundamentally 
different. As Professor Blake explained:  
[The] objective [of postemployment restraint] is not to prevent the 
competitive use of the unique personal qualities of the employee–either 
during or after the employment–but to prevent competitive use, for a time, 
of information or relationships which pertain peculiarly to the employer 
and which the employee acquired in the course of the employment. Unlike 
a restraint accompanying a sale of good will, an employee restraint is not 
necessary for the employer to get the full value of the thing being 
acquired–in this case, the employee's current services. 
Thus, a key to the reasonableness of an employee restraint is that 
it is not for the purpose of preventing competition, but rather, is 
designed to prevent an employee from using “peculiar” information 
or relationships learned from a former employer in competition with 
the former employer. Also, while the particular formulations of the 
test of reasonableness differ from state to state, with some being more 
																																								 																				
 15. See Blake, supra note 5 (noting that the history of restraints on trade “may cast some 
light on the continuing debate between proponents of ‘per se’ doctrines and those advocating 
extension of the ‘rule of reason’”).          
 16. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 271. 
 17. See, e.g., Sherman v. Pffeferkorn, 241 Mass. 468, 474-75 (1922) (describing the two 
types of cases and noting the need for different analyses). See also Blake, supra note 5, at 646; 
Restatement (First) of Contracts § 515(e) (1932). 
 18. See Blake, supra note 5. 
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detailed than others are, the enforceability of NCAs generally requires 
that the restraint be no greater than is required for the protection of 
the employer, not impose undue hardship on the employee, and not be 
injurious to the public.19 Under antitrust law, the injury requires a 
balancing of the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of the 
restraint,20 which, in the case of NCAs, makes the purpose and scope 
of the restraint key considerations that should not be ignored. As the 
foregoing quote by Judge Taft indicates, the restraint must be 
supported by a legitimate business purpose. 
B. The Legitimate Business Interest Requirement 
At common law, the requirement that restraints of trade be 
ancillary to a lawful contract required that the restraints be 
“reasonably necessary” to protect a “legitimate business interest”21 In 
U.S. v. Addyston Pipe, Judge Taft listed five previously recognized 
ancillary purposes, including agreements with an “assistant, servant, 
or agent” to protect “from the danger of loss to the employer's 
business caused by the unjust use on the part of the employee of the 
confidential knowledge acquired in such business.”22 
Although principles of trade secret law began to emerge in the 
United States in 1837,23 many of the early cases involved trade secrets 
related to a business being sold or to specific trade secrets being sold 
or licensed, and not to trade secrets shared in the context of an 
employment relationship.24 As NCAs became more prevalent in the 
employment context, and a legitimate business interest to justify such 
restrictions had to be found, the protection of confidential information 
and customer relationships emerged as the predominate justification.25 
																																								 																				
 19. Id. at 648-49; see also Restatement (First) of Contracts § 515 (1932); Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 187 (1981). 
 20. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) (“Under this rule, 
the fact finder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive 
practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.”). 
 21. Both Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 281, and the California case of Wright v. 
Ryder, 36 Cal. 342 (1868), provide detailed accounts of the common law development of 
restraints of trade through the end of the 1800s. The Restatement (First) of Contracts, sets forth 
the same law as further developed and refined through 1932.  
 22. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 281. 
 23. Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523 (1837). 
 24. See, e.g., Welch, 26 Mass. at 523; Wilder v. Adams, 29 F. Cas. 1216 (C.C.D. Mass. 
1846); Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868) (an early case involving the employment 
relationship). 
 25. See e.g., Pffeferkorn, 241 Mass. at 474-75; Chandler, Gardner & Williams, Inc. v. 
Reynolds, 250 Mass. 309 (1924); Boston & Suburban Laundry Co., Inc. v. O’Reilly, 253 Mass, 
94 (1925).  
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In fact, such a justification was included in the commentary to the 
Restatement (First) of Contracts, published in 1932, which provides: 
A promise of a former employee will not ordinarily be enforced so as to 
preclude him from exercising skill and knowledge acquired in his 
employer's business, even if the competition is injurious to the latter, 
except so far as to prevent the use of trade secrets or lists of customers, or 
unless the services of the employee are of a unique character.26 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts is in accord, noting the 
difficulty of justifying employee restraints without a “legitimate 
interest in restraining the employee from appropriating valuable trade 
information and customer relationships.”27 
There are various stated reasons for recognizing the protection of 
confidential information as a legitimate business interest to support 
employee restraints. First, such a rule is consistent with the law of 
trade secrecy that holds, in many situations, that employees are under 
an implied obligation to maintain their employer’s trade secrets.28 
Second, and related to the first, is a sort of “but-for” test that is 
applied when the circumstances indicate that the employee could not 
have obtained the subject information except in the context of his 
employment with the plaintiff/employer.29 An overriding justification 
for the rule is the perceived equities of the circumstances, particularly 
since the remedy that is ordinarily sought is injunctive relief.30 As 
summarized by Professor Blake: “What most . . . cases require . . . is 
that the employer show special circumstances which make it unfair 
for him to bear all the risk of placing the employee in a position in 
which a later breach of confidence might be costly.”31 This generally 
requires a business interest that enjoys “some degree of legal 
protection even in the absence of a contract.”32  
As the circumstances surrounding employee restraints move 
away from cases of clear access to trade secret information to other 
																																								 																				
 26. Restatement (First) of Contracts § 516(f) (1932).   
 27. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188 (1981). 
 28. See e.g., Pffeferkorn, 241 Mass. at 474-75 (citing Anchor Electric v. Hawkes, 171 
Mass. 101 (1898), among other cases). 
 29. O’Reilly, 253 Mass at 94; Molina v. Barany, 56 N.Y.S. 2d 214 (1945).  
 30. When the cause of action to enforce an NCA is based upon contract law, the remedy 
sought is typically specific performance of the restraint. When the underlying cause of action is 
a trade secret misappropriation claim, the remedy sought is an injunction. Because both 
remedies are equitable remedies, courts will consider the equities of the situation before 
deciding to grant the requested relief. See generally Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Chapter 
16 Remedies, Topic 3, Enforcement by Specific Performance of Injunction (1981, updated 
2016).   
 31. Blake, supra note 5, at 651. 
 32. Id. at 653. 
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types of employer-owned confidential information (or none at all), the 
“legitimate business interest” analysis becomes more complicated. 
The inquiry generally examines: (1) the nature of the underlying 
information and whether it is already publicly known, including 
whether the information constitutes the general skill and knowledge 
of the employee;33 and (2) whether the information was subject to 
efforts to keep it confidential.34 But the mere existence of 
“protectable” information is not the end of the inquiry. “A restraint is 
reasonable only if it (1) is no greater than is required for the 
protection of the employer, (2) does not impose undue hardship on 
the employee, and (3) is not injurious to the public.”35 
In recent years, courts that have considered the enforceability of 
NCAs in the context of employment agreements often fail to explore 
the issue of legitimate business interest in-depth, instead skipping 
ahead to the second part of the reasonableness analysis to determine if 
the restrictions on future employment are reasonable in scope.36 
While greater empirical research is needed on this point, it seems that 
contemporary courts either look for “ancillary agreements” without 
exploring the actual purpose of those agreements or are more willing 
to accept an employer’s bald assertions of the need to protect 
confidential information than was the case before 1960,37 even though 
the requirements for trade secret protection have become more 
exacting since the adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) 
in 1979.38 But while ignoring this critical issue is problematic from 
both a legal and policy perspective, it also provides a means to 
improve the NCA enforceability analysis through the simple 
expedient of requiring courts to find a “legitimate” business interest 
before engaging in the reasonableness analysis.    
 
																																								 																				
 33. Id. at 672. 
 34. Id. at 673-74. 
 35. Id. at 648-49 (noting that these categories are adapted from the Restatement’s 
formulation.). 
 36. See, e.g., Bodemer v. Swanel Beverage, Inc., 884 F. Supp. 2d 717 (N.D. Ind. 2012). 
Compare Wrigg v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C., 362 Mont. 496, 500 (2011) 
(noting that the legitimate business requirement “acknowledges the long standing principle that 
a covenant that serves no legitimate business interest necessarily is oppressive and invalid.”). 
 37. See Blake, supra note 5, at 649-50 (“[H]aving completed the analysis of the extent of 
a protectable interest, courts usually find the relevant considerations exhausted; the other 
branches of the Restatement formulation are seldom, as separate considerations, given much 
attention.”). 
 38. Among other changes, the UTSA made the definition of a trade secret more exacting 
and specifically precluded other tort claims involving “competitively significant information.” 
See UTSA § 1 and § 4 (1985). 
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C. The Requirement of Reasonableness 
Determining that a restraint is “ancillary to the main purpose of a 
lawful contract” and that there is a “legitimate business interest” to 
support the restraint is only part of the required analysis concerning 
the enforceability of NCAs. The next step is to determine if the scope 
of the restraint is “reasonable,” i.e., no more than necessary to further 
the employer’s legitimate business interest. In Arthur Murray Dance 
Studios of Cleveland v. Witter, one court set forth forty-one questions 
that could be asked concerning the reasonableness of employee 
restraints.39 More narrowly, the scope of restraint analysis typically 
examines: (1) the nature of the business and related field-of-use 
restrictions; (2) the duration of the restriction; (3) the geographic 
reach of the restriction; and (4) in the case of NCAs to protect trade 
secrets, how quickly the trade secret may diminish.40 Courts will also 
consider the financial hardship to the employee if the noncompetition 
agreement is enforced and the public interest.41  
NCAs, like any contract in the United States, require 
consideration in exchange for the promise. In the employment 
context, if signed at the beginning of the employment relationship, the 
employment itself provides the required consideration in many 
jurisdictions.42 If signed after employment begins, continued 
employment might be sufficient if it was understood from the 
beginning that such an agreement would be a condition of the job. 
Continued employment is enough consideration in about thirty-five 
states.43 However, the length of the continued employment that is 
deemed sufficient can vary. For instance, in Tennessee, Illinois, and 
the District of Columbia, if the employment was for an “appreciably 
long” time or of “sufficient duration” then it will be deemed sufficient 
consideration.44 Idaho has an interesting variation that ties the 
consideration of additional consideration to the length of the NCA.45 
Under Idaho law, an NCA that does not provide additional 
																																								 																				
 39. Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland v. Witter, 105 N.E. 2d 685 (Ohio Com. 
Pl. 1952). 
 40. See SHARON K. SANDEEN & ELIZABETH A. ROWE, TRADE SECRET LAW IN A 
NUTSHELL (2013). 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. at 211. 
 43. Id. 
 44. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF PRESS SECRETARY, NON-COMPETE REFORM: A 
POLICYMAKER’S GUIDE TO STATE POLICIES (2016), http://bit.do/NoncompeteReform [hereinafter 
Non-Compete Reform]. 
 45. IOWA CODE ANN. § 550.2 (WEST 2016) 
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consideration cannot exceed eighteen months.46 In about thirteen 
states, the mere continuation of at-will employment is not enough 
consideration for a noncompetition agreement signed during the term 
of the employment.47 Thus, the employer must provide fresh 
consideration, such as a salary increase.  
II. RECENT EFFORTS TO REFORM THE LAW GOVERNING 
NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS   
There has recently been a wave of attempts by those who wish to 
ban NCAs to modify the laws in states that enforce them. The 
Alliance for Open Competition (AOC), among other organizations 
and individuals, has lobbied nationwide as part of these efforts.48 The 
group’s objective is to “break down a major barrier to 
entrepreneurialism; the use of non-competition agreements mandated 
by employers that force employees to sign away their rights to engage 
in any business of a competitive nature when they leave their present 
jobs.”49  
A. State Efforts 
Legislators in states like Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Oregon, and Washington, have considered legislation 
restricting NCAs. Recent efforts failed in Massachusetts,50 
Michigan,51 and Washington,52 but Oregon passed legislation in 
201553 and Hawaii54 and Illinois55 passed legislation in 2016. More 
legislation is expected to be introduced in 2017.  
In general, the efforts to reform NCAs have focused on several 
respectable objectives. These include, for instance, creating greater 
transparency for employees regarding the terms of noncompetition 
agreements, eradicating enforcement of noncompetition agreements 
against low-wage workers, implementing exemptions for certain 
occupations, and restricting the geographic scope and duration of 
																																								 																				
 46. Id. 
 47. ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS, § 6.01[3][F][I] (2016) (discussing 
whether at-will employment is consideration for a restrictive covenant). 
 48. Alliance for Open Competition, About Us, OPEN COMPETITION (2017), 
http://bit.do/AllianceOpenCompetition. See also the advocacy efforts of various labor unions.  
 49. Id. 
 50. See H.B 4323 (Mass. 2016). 
 51. See H.B. 4198 (Mich. 2015). 
 52. See H.B. 1926, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015). 
 53. OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295 (2016). 
 54. See 2015 Haw. Sess. Laws 158.  
 55. See 2016 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 99-860 (S.B. 3163) (West). 
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noncompetition clauses.56 Several state legislatures have considered 
changes to their noncompetition regimes. Some, like Georgia, have 
actually moved toward greater enforcement.57 Alabama further 
clarified what is a valid protectable interest for such agreements.58 
Some states have limited or prohibited noncompetition 
agreements for certain occupations: New Mexico restricts 
enforceability for some healthcare practitioners,59 and Hawaii 
prohibits them for technology workers.60 There were proposals in 
New Jersey and Maryland to make NCAs unenforceable for those 
workers who may be eligible for unemployment compensation.61 
Recent reform efforts in some states have also attempted to 
legislatively limit the duration of postemployment restrictions. For 
instance, Oregon has restricted noncompetition agreements to a 
maximum of eighteen months,62 and Washington to one year.63 
B. Federal Efforts and the DTSA 
On the federal level, proposals during the 114th Congress (2015-
2016), titled the Mobility and Opportunity for Vulnerable Employees 
Act (MOVE)64 and the LADDER Act,65 were introduced but not 
passed. This legislation was motivated by the fear that 
noncompetition agreements are now being used to restrict not only 
higher earning executives and top-level employees, but minimum-
wage workers at fast food restaurants66 and even dog sitters.67  
The DTSA, while not expressly endorsing any particular state’s 
approach, contains a provision that was intended to honor the 
noncompetition laws of each state. However, the provision, in effect, 
takes a strong position against the enforcement of NCAs. Section 
1836 (b)(3)(A)(i), provides that a court may grant an injunction 
provided that it does not: 
																																								 																				
 56. See Non-Compete Reform, supra note 44, at 2.  
 57. GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-53 (2012).   
 58. ALA. CODE § 8-1-190 (2016). 
 59. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-1I-2 (2015). 
 60. HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-4(d). A similar bill was also proposed in Missouri but did not 
pass. H.R. 1660, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016). 
 61. See N.J. Assemb. 3970, 215th Leg. (N.J. 2013); S. 468, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Md. 2013). 
 62. Or. Rev. Stat. § 653.295(2) (2016). 
 63. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-51-201 (LEXISNEXIS 2016).  
 64. ME Act, S. 1504, 114th Cong. (2015).  
 65. LADDER Act, H.R. 2873, 114th Cong. (2015).  
 66. See Press Release, Congressman Joseph Crowley, Jimmy John’s Takes a Bite Out of 
Workers’ Rights (Oct. 22, 2014), http://bit.do/JimmyJohnsWorkersRights. 
 67. See Jamieson, supra note 1, at 2. 
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(I) prevent a person from entering into an employment relationship, and 
that conditions placed on such employment shall be based on evidence of 
threatened misappropriation, and not merely on the information the person 
knows; or (II) otherwise conflict with an applicable State law prohibiting 
restraints on the practice of a lawful profession, trade, or business.68  
This language could be read to prevent a court from granting an 
injunction restraining an employee from working for another 
employer in any state, even in states that enforce noncompetition 
agreements, at least with respect to the remedies that are available for 
trade secret misappropriation under the DTSA.69 It follows then that 
employers in states that enforce NCAs will need to rely on state 
contract and trade secret law to restrain employees from working for 
competitors. For those in states like California, applying the DTSA 
will largely mirror the existing state law on noncompetition 
agreements and the inevitable disclosure doctrine.  
With respect to the inevitable disclosure doctrine, the DTSA 
does not adopt the doctrine, instead seemingly preventing application 
of the doctrine in states that recognize it. The language of section 
1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I), supra, provides that an injunction must be based 
on evidence of threatened misappropriation, and not merely on the 
fact that an individual knows certain information. However, the 
clause preceding that language, which bans injunctions restraining 
employment, seems to eviscerate the heart of the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine (which usually prevents an employee from working for a 
competitor for a certain period). Accordingly, the DTSA strikes a 
blow to states that recognize the inevitable disclosure doctrine by 
making that doctrine inapplicable in DTSA actions. 
III. THE BENEFITS OF CALIFORNIA’S APPROACH   
The California approach to the enforceability of NCAs dates 
back to the late 1800s when the California Legislature was one of the 
first states to adopt a comprehensive set of civil codes and reflects a 
clear choice that the California legislature made in 1872 to opt for a 
default rule of unenforceability. The legislation (now codified in 
Business & Professions Code section 16600, hereafter “16600”) 
followed an 1868 case in which the California Supreme Court, after 
carefully detailing the common law on restraints of trade, decided not 
to enforce an NCA that would have prevented the buyer of a 
																																								 																				
 68. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(I)-(II) (West 2016). 
 69. A review of the legislative history raises a question about whether this was what was 
intended by Congress. This provision was heavily influenced and lobbied for by those 
representing the California view on inevitable disclosure and employee mobility. Sen. Feinstein 
(of California), in particular, was a key advocate and supporter of this approach. 
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steamboat from operating in the waters of California.70 Although the 
seller urged the court to respect the freedom to contract, the court 
ruled that the public’s interest in free competition overrode such 
principle, in part due to the court’s concern that it would be difficult 
to discern where a contract was a limited restraint and where it was 
not.71 
A. California’s Approach Focuses Attention on Whether a 
Legitimate Business Interest Exists 
As a result of California’s early rejection of NCAs, the state 
never really developed a body of law that recognized the protection of 
trade secrets as a legitimate business interest to justify employee 
NCAs and, in fact, never developed the so-called “trade secret 
exception” to 16600. Rather, the need for a legitimate business 
interest is built into the types of restraints of trade it will enforce; 
namely, nondisclosure agreements and nonsolicitation agreements. 
The California approach, while rejecting NCAs except in connection 
with the sale of a business, looks closely at the real purpose of the 
restrictions. Regardless of the title that is placed on a contract or 
clause, the critical issue in California is whether the agreement 
restricts an individual in their trade or profession. If it does, it will not 
be enforced, but if the agreement merely precludes the use or 
disclosure of confidential information or the solicitation of former 
clients, then it is not an NCA and will be enforced if otherwise 
reasonable. This was the result in Gordon v. Landau, the case often 
cited as creating the so-called trade secret exception but which, in 
reality, simply recognized that nondisclosure agreements designed to 
protect trade secrets can be enforceable in California.72  
 Seen in the foregoing light, California law is not that far 
removed from the common law approach. In states that properly 
apply the common law approach instead of the California approach, 
employee NCAs are only enforced if an interest in protecting 
legitimate trade secrets and confidential information is shown. In 
																																								 																				
 70. Wright v. Ryder, 36 Cal. 342 (1868).  
 71. Id. at 361 (“But we have grave doubts whether, in this age of abundant capital and 
active competition in all the avenues of commerce, the withdrawal of a single boat from our 
navigable waters could be deemed an appreciable restraint upon trade, or result in the slightest 
inconvenience to the public. The difficulty lies in fixing the line between that which is or is not 
an appreciable restraint of trade.”). 
 72. Gordon v. Landau, 49 Cal. 2d 690, 694 (1958) (“It clearly appears from the terms of 
the contract that it did not prevent defendant from carrying on a weekly credit business or any 
other business. He merely agreed not to use plaintiffs’ confidential lists to solicit customers for 
himself for a period of one year following termination of his employment. Such an agreement is 
valid and enforceable.”); see also Ret. Grp. v. Galante, 176 Cal. App. 4th 1226 (2009). 
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California, an NCA will not be enforced, but nondisclosure 
agreements to protect legitimate trade secrets and confidential 
information will be. In both cases, however, the restrictions must be 
tailored to the interest sought to be protected and be reasonable in 
scope. By making most NCAs unenforceable, California decided that 
restrictions on employees that extend beyond a promise not to use or 
disclose confidential information are unreasonable 
B.  California’s Approach Does Not Unduly Burden Employees 
The tendency of contemporary courts and litigants to pay scant 
attention to the legitimate business interest prong of the NCA 
enforceability analysis is one reason why states may wish to adopt the 
California approach and render most NCAs void ab initio. But there 
are other reasons and, at bottom, the choice (particularly in the 
employment context) comes down to who should bear the burden of 
negotiating and litigating a reasonable NCA. More to the point, to 
what extent can states trust employers within their state to only draft 
and seek to enforce “reasonable” NCAs? If most employers cannot be 
trusted to draft reasonable NCAs that are designed to protect 
legitimate business interests, then the likely costs to a state are undue 
restrictions on employee mobility, reduced competition, and more 
litigation. Under California’s approach, the burden of drafting an 
appropriately tailored agreement that is focused on a legitimate 
business interest is placed upon employers. 
California’s approach also reduces litigation to enforce NCAs, 
either because lawsuits are not brought in the first place or because it 
provides a relatively quick means for employees who are sued to 
prevail on a Motion for Summary Judgment.73 Additionally, by 
stating that most NCAs are unenforceable, there are less means by 
which threats of lawsuits can be used to chill legitimate behavior—
including competition—by former employees. This is because, 
although threats may still be made (particularly if the employee also 
signed a nondisclosure agreement), it is fairly easy for employees in 
California (and their attorneys) to learn that the NCA they signed 
cannot be enforced. Moreover, illegal NCAs in California may be the 
basis of a claim for unfair business practices74 and terminating an 
																																								 																				
 73. See, e.g., Dowell v. Biosense Webster, Inc., 179 Cal. App. 4th 564, 570 (2009) (trial 
court granted motion for summary judgment on the ground that restrictive covenant was void ab 
initio). 
 74. Dowell v. Biosense Webster, Inc., 179 Cal. App. 4th 564, 575 (2009) (“An 
employer’s use of an illegal non-compete agreement also violates the UCL § 17200 [“unfair 
competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice 
and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising”].).” 
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employee for violating or refusing to sign an unenforceable NCA may 
constitute wrongful termination.75 
C.  California’s Approach Is More Efficient, Clear, and 
Predictable 
Three related benefits of California’s approach are its efficiency, 
clarity, and predictability. As noted previously, forty-six states and 
the District of Columbia recognize and enforce reasonable NCAs.76 
Of these, twenty-six have statutes governing their enforcement, while 
the remainder rely largely on common law.77 As a practical matter, 
this means that the particular laws and policies of each state must be 
researched to determine if an NCA will be enforced, a process that 
most employees cannot afford to pursue. Employers are also 
adversely affected by inconsistent and unclear laws governing NCAs, 
increasing their transaction costs as they try to craft agreements that 
will be enforced in multiple states. Adding to the inefficiency is the 
fact that the reasonableness analysis is very fact-driven and, at the 
time an NCA is entered into, can only be determined based upon 
representations that are often unverifiable. The inability to verify the 
existence of trade secrets and other confidential information before an 
NCA is entered into is of particular concern. 
Given the nature of trade secrets—namely, the fact that they are 
supposed to remain at least “relatively secret”—there are practical 
problems associated with an employee trying to determine if a 
legitimate business interest to protect trade secrets actually exists. For 
one, anything more than a general description of trade secrets in an 
NCA would create another document that might lead to the disclosure 
and loss of those trade secrets. Second, trade secrets are not “granted” 
like patent rights and there is no place to “register” them like 
trademarks and copyrights, meaning that there is no independent and 
preexisting body of information that an employee can search to verify 
the existence of alleged trade secrets. Third, although employees are 
often required to sign NCAs or nondisclosure agreements, employers 
do not always adequately identify or mark the information that they 
claim to be trade secret or confidential information.   
In light of the strong policy against restraints of trade, there is 
something unsettling about enforcing NCAs when the putative trade 
secret owner does not have to specifically identify and prove the 
																																								 																				
 75. Silguero v. Creteguard, Inc., 187 Cal. App. 4th 60, 63, as modified on denial of reh’g 
(Aug. 16, 2010). 
 76. Infra Part II.   
 77. Id. 
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existence of trade secrets and confidential information at the time the 
agreement is entered into. If the mere assertion of trade secret rights is 
the only thing that is needed to justify restraints on trade, there is a 
great risk of the over-assertion of such rights, or what Judge Taft 
referred to as “corporations perpetually laboring for exclusive 
advantages in trade.”78 What company wouldn’t assert the existence 
of trade secrets if it provides a ready basis upon which to restrict 
competition? Thus, if we really care about free competition, the 
legitimacy of the business interest should depend upon something 
more than the alleged existence of trade secrets. Or, as California has 
decided, NCAs in such circumstances can be banned altogether. 
Lastly, the California view has important ancillary effects that lie 
at the heart of the policy choice. First, it promotes competition, 
including the ability of former employees to create competitive 
businesses that, in theory, have the salutary effect of lowering costs to 
consumers. Second, the policy can lead to greater innovation, 
creativity, and efficiency, as the competitive businesses founded by 
former employees attempt to differentiate themselves from their 
competition, including former employers. Third, California’s view 
promotes employee mobility, including personal growth and potential 
upward mobility. It also encourages the workforce to be productive, 
rather than spending a year or more on “garden leave” or in jobs that 
do not fully utilize an employee’s talents. 
IV. THE BENEFITS OF THE MAJORITY VIEW   
While some scholars have argued for the adoption of the 
California view and against the enforcement of NCAs for many of the 
reasons detailed above,79 and that noncompetition agreements are 
superfluous in light of the availability of trade secret protection,80 
there is another story that can be told about the use of NCAs to 
protect trade secrets. Here, Professor Rowe details what she considers 
are the benefits of employee NCAs that are designed to protect trade 
secrets. She asserts that when trade secrets are genuinely at risk, 
NCAs provide an additional level of protection that is often better 
suited to the circumstances than nondisclosure agreements (NDAs). 
																																								 																				
 78. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 279. 
 79. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE 118-19 (2013); Viva R. Moffat, 
Making Non-Competes Unenforceable, 54 Ariz. L. Rev. 939, 965-84 (2012); Viva R. Moffat, 
The Wrong Tool for the Wrong Job: The IP Problem with Noncompetition Agreements, 52 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 873, 873 (2010).  
 80. See Maura Irene Strassberg, An Ethical Rabbit Hole: Model Rule 
4.4, Intentional Interference with Former Employee Non-Disclosure Agreements and the Threat 
of Disqualification, Part II, 89 NEB. L. REV. 923 (2011). 
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To the extent there are concerns about some aspects of NCAs, she 
argues that there are existing mechanisms to protect the interests of 
employees, and more targeted approaches to addressing specific 
problems with non-competes might be a more fruitful focus for both 
employers and employees rather than the impulsive motivation to ban 
NCAs altogether. 
A. NCAs Supplement Trade Secret Protection 
As detailed above, the protection of trade secrets has long been 
considered a legitimate business interest that can justify an NCA.81 
However, not only are trade secrets a legitimate protectable interest of 
an employer, but information that does not reach the level of a trade 
secret and is merely “confidential” to the employer has also been 
deemed sufficient to support reasonable restraints against an 
employee.82 Indeed, perhaps it is the notion of commercial privacy or 
protection against commercial piracy that is really at the heart of the 
legitimate business interest requirement.83 Because employers have a 
broad range of proprietary interests worth protecting from employee 
piracy, NCAs are needed to supplement the law of trade secrecy 
which does not protect all confidential and proprietary information. 
The rising importance of business information also suggests that it is 
not only employees who are exposed to technical trade secrets who 
might need to enter into noncompetition agreements. Just as it is 
standard advice that employers should enter into appropriate 
nondisclosure agreements with their employees in order to protect 
their trade secrets, it would be unwise to suggest that they only do so 
with employees exposed to technical information.  
Both the UTSA and DTSA permit the granting of injunctions for 
threatened misappropriation of trade secrets84 and, therefore, one 
remedy available to courts is to enjoin an employee from working for 
a competitor. However, this option is also quite controversial.85 
Courts, in general, are reluctant to grant such a drastic remedy for the 
same reasons that contractual restraints of trade are suspect. The 
presence of a contractual agreement between the employer and the 
																																								 																				
 81. See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Desatnick, 58 F. Supp. 2d 477, 489 (D.N.J. 1999); 
Diodato v. Wells Fargo, 44 F. Supp. 3d 541, 568 (M.D. Pa. 2014).  
 82. See, e.g., Campbell Soup, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 489; Proudfoot Consulting Co. v. Gordon, 
576 F.3d 223, 1233-36 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 83. See, e.g., Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Strauman, 353 NE. 2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1976) 
(noting that an employer has a legitimate interest “in safeguarding that which his business made 
successful and to protect himself against deliberate surreptitious commercial piracy”).  
 84. Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 2 (1985). 
 85. See NON-COMPETE CONTRACTS, supra note 22, at 4. 
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employee, i.e., an NCA, often is the difference in a court deciding 
whether to impose this injunctive remedy to restrain an employee. 
Moreover, a properly worded and tailored NCA helps the court and 
the parties to identify the information at issue and can serve as a 
check on employer tendencies to claim more trade secrets post-
employment than were identified during the employment.  
Even without an NCA, some courts apply the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine to prevent an employee from working for a new 
employer.86 It is a highly controversial remedy precisely because 
critics complain that there is no contractual agreement between the 
employer and employee. If NCAs designed to protect trade secrets are 
also disallowed, the reasoning becomes circular: trade secret law, by 
itself, cannot replace NCAs because when it does, it falls prey to the 
same arguments about fairness and employee mobility that are used to 
attack NCAs. Under the DTSA, the argument is even more tenuous 
because it explicitly does not permit injunctions that would restrain an 
employee from working for a competitor.87 It is, therefore, not an 
option—not even in states that permit NCAs.88 Accordingly, federal 
civil protection for trade secret misappropriation does not supply a 
substitute or a remedy that achieves the same objectives as an NCA. 
Rather, an employer would need to file an action for breach of 
contract or under the state trade secret misappropriation statute, rather 
than under the DTSA, if it wishes to restrain an employee.89 Of 
course, the breach of contract action would only provide for such a 
remedy if the trade secret owner was suing to enforce a contractual 
agreement like an NCA.90 
B. Employers Have Incentives to Draft Reasonable NCAs 
Careful attention to the drafting stage of the NCAs might be a 
very fruitful focus for both employers’ and employees’ interests. 
Given the importance of trade secrets to companies, when faced with 
the legitimate threat of misappropriation from a soon to be former 
employee, it is certainly in the employer’s best interest to have 
drafted an agreement that the court will deem reasonable and 
therefore enforceable. Employers, therefore, have every incentive to 
																																								 																				
 86. See Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443 (M.D.N.C. 1996); Barilla America, Inc. 
v. Wright, No. 4-02-CV-90267, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12773 (S.D. Iowa July 5, 2002). 
 87. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(I) (West 2014). 
 88. Id. 
 89. See infra Part II.B. 
 90. Although the UTSA precludes all tort claims related to “competitively significant 
information” other that trade secret claims, it specifically does not preclude breach of contract 
claims. See U.T.S.A. § 7 (amended 1985). 
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draft NCAs that will be enforced by the courts, in the event that it 
becomes necessary to file an action against a former employee.  
Arguably, if an NCA looks like an agreement that one might 
have arrived at after careful deliberation and negotiation between the 
employer and an employee who is represented by counsel, rather than 
an overbroad contract of adhesion, it is more likely to be enforced.91 
This is why, for instance, those cases where employers agree to pay 
the salary of the employee while he or she sits out for a certain period 
of time before joining the new employer are an easier call for courts. 
These “garden leave” type agreements, though not as widely accepted 
in the United States as they are in Europe,92 go a long way to 
addressing the interests of both sides: compensation to the employee 
for the restriction on his mobility for a limited time, and assurances to 
the employer that its trade secrets will be protected during its most 
vulnerable period. Nonetheless, a focus on the scope and nature of the 
information to be protected is also necessary. 
When the focus of an NCA shifts away from the protection of 
“all information” and toward the protection of legitimate and 
identified trade secrets and confidential information, it is more likely 
to be enforced, but as importantly, it is more likely to be understood 
and honored by employees. When this shift in focus occurs, then only 
those employees who in fact have access to such secrets and who are 
exposed to sensitive information should be entering into NCAs. If 
employers also adopt the recommended trade secret protection 
strategy of “need to know” rather than “good to know,” they will 
naturally limit the number of NCAs that are required.    
C. The Difficulty and Costs of Enforcing NCAs Serve as a 
Check on Abuses  
Largely missing from the debates about the enforceability of 
NCAs in the trade secret context is the recognition that courts already 
have a wide range of options to enforce trade secret rights, including 
tailoring specific injunctions to prevent misappropriation when an 
employee accepts work with a competitor that risks disclosure of the 
former employer’s trade secrets. Thus, whether deciding to issue an 
injunction pursuant to a UTSA or DTSA claim or to specifically 
enforce a restriction in an NCA, courts are acting “in equity” and are 
																																								 																				
 91. See Spann v. Lovett & Co., Ltd., 2012 Ark. App. 107, 389 S.W.3d 77, 90 (2012) 
(holding that a contract not to compete was reasonable, one of the factors being the contract was 
negotiated). 
 92. See generally, Charles A. Sullivan, Tending the Garden: Restricting Competition via 
“Garden Leave”, 37 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 293, 299-305 (2016).  
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required to balance the rights of the employer with the rights of the 
employee and the public. Before limiting an employee’s mobility 
there must be a strong business justification. This does not necessarily 
present a binary choice of working for the competitor or not. Rather, 
there is a middle ground, wherein some courts will permit the 
employee to accept his or her new assignment, but provide for 
separation or reassignment of certain tasks and duties for a certain 
period of time in order to avoid even the temptation to disclose the 
former employer’s trade secrets. While it could be argued that this 
weighs in favor of banning NCAs because the injunctive mechanisms 
within trade secret law already provide a satisfactory remedy,93 
arguably injunctions related to enforceable NCAs can be more readily 
tailored to the circumstances as defined in the NCA itself.    
In most jurisdictions, courts will reform an NCA that is 
determined to be unreasonable.94 Some courts adopt this “blue 
pencil” approach and will partially enforce95 the agreement, while 
others void the entire agreement if one provision is unreasonable.96 
However, courts may not add terms to a contract under the “blue 
pencil” approach. In states that follow an equitable reform or 
reformation doctrine, judges can amend any questionable language in 
order to create an enforceable contract that matches the original intent 
of the parties. This is more flexible than the blue pencil doctrine, but 
some worry that it may encourage employers to include riskier 
provisions in their agreements. This can then affect the behavior of 
employees who rely on language that is unlikely to be enforced. Some 
states, however, in “red pencil” jurisdictions, do not allow any 
modification of contracts and instead courts in these jurisdictions will 
render the entire contract unenforceable, if any provision is found to 
be unenforceable.  
Courts therefore have the flexibility to consider a whole host of 
information beyond the specific terms of the agreement in deciding 
whether it would be equitable to restrain the employee. One 
																																								 																				
 93. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 94. See e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335(1) (West 2015); MICH. COMP. LAW ANN. 
§445.774a (West 2015); TEX. BUS. & COM. ANN. § 15.51(c) (West 2015).  
 95. See Ferrofluidics Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum Components, Inc., 968 F.2d 1463,1469 
(1st Cir. 1992) (The term “blue penciling” refers to the process of amending contract terms as 
opposed to refusing to enforce them. Professional editors (before word processing) often used 
blue pencils to indicate changes and red pencils to indicate deletions. With respect to NCAs, the 
term “blue penciling” refers to processes whereby NCAs may be re-written by courts instead of 
being held unenforceable. The term “red penciling” means that a court is unwilling to rewrite an 
unreasonable term contained in an NCA.).  
 96. See WIS. STAT. § 103.465 (West 2015) (specifying that unreasonable restraints are 
unenforceable even though other parts of the contract might be reasonable). 
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consideration, for instance, could be the occupational field of work in 
which the agreement is being used. Employees in occupations like 
engineering and computer science are more likely to sign 
noncompetition agreements.97 This is not particularly surprising or 
troubling given that these types of employees tend to be involved in 
research and development, and thus privy to sensitive trade secret 
information. Nevertheless, while the field of work or one’s position 
alone should not be determinative, these can be important 
considerations for a court in deciding how to carve out appropriate 
relief. 
In addition to the courts’ flexibility in enforcing NCAs, the 
practical reality is that there are many reasons why NCAs are unlikely 
to be enforced by employers in the first place. Professor 
Gomulkiewicz, in an excellent article, discussed evidence of the 
“leakiness” of noncompetition agreements in the state of Washington. 
He found that between 2005 and 2014, there were only thirty-two 
cases against former employees to enforce noncompetition 
agreements in Washington courts.98 He identifies several reasons that 
might explain this phenomenon, including, the costs of litigation, the 
risks of counter litigation, the risks of disclosing trade secrets during 
litigation, and potential negative public relations for the employer.99  
He suggests that employers may choose to file actions against the 
departing employees to enforce noncompetition agreements only in 
the most egregious cases.100 There is no reason to believe that a 
similar pattern does not exist in all or most states that enforce NCAs 
and that such a lack of enforcement could serve to mute the overall 
effect of having employees sign noncompetition agreements. 
Moreover, about half of the states that allow noncompetition 
agreements already provide exemptions for certain professions. 
Interestingly, the professions most often exempted are broadcasters 
and medical practitioners.101 Seven states exempt broadcasters from 
their noncompetition laws, including Arizona, Connecticut, District of 
Columbia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maine, and Washington.102 Part of 
the concern is that broadcasters working in, for instance, rural areas 
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may have very limited options for employment. Another seven states 
have exemptions for physicians and medical practitioners.103 These 
include Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, New Mexico, Rhode Island, 
Tennessee, and Texas.104 It is believed that noncompetition 
agreements interfere with patients access to medical providers as well 
as patient’s rights to choose their providers.105 
D.  Legislation Can Address Specific Concerns While Not 
Banning NCAs 
Even if noncompetition agreements are often not enforced across 
the country, there is still concern about possible chilling effects on 
employees who have these restrictive agreements in their contracts 
and are unaware of the likelihood of enforcement. More targeted 
approaches to addressing these specific concerns rather than painting 
NCAs with a broad brush might prove more fruitful.  
Sometimes, employers present to employees noncompetition 
agreements that contain unenforceable or overbroad provisions. 
Because workers are not usually aware of the unenforceability of such 
provisions, such terms can have a chilling effect on their behavior, 
particularly if employers are known to threaten litigation. However, 
banning noncompetition agreements in a particular state does not 
necessarily protect employees in that state from having to sign such 
agreements. For instance, even though California does not enforce 
NCAs, one study found that 62% of CEO contracts for companies 
headquartered in California contained noncompetition clauses.106 
This means that the chilling effect on mobility, assuming the pattern 
bears out for noncompetition agreements in general, would not be 
erased. Accordingly, some attention might be given to efforts to 
discourage employer’s from including unenforceable terms in their 
agreements.  
Steps to encourage transparency of NCAs might go a long way 
in this effort. Ideally, for those employees who are well-informed and 
consult with counsel, steps can be taken to reduce the likelihood of 
litigation or to negotiate favorable terms in the beginning of the 
employment process that would leave out or mute the effect of a very 
restrictive noncompetition agreement. In some cases, employees also 
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negotiate with their new employers to receive what is effectively the 
cost of defense and indemnification if the former employer decides to 
file an action to enforce the noncompetition agreement. If, however, it 
is the rare employee who is in a position to bargain or negotiate the 
terms of his or her noncompetition agreement,107 then the argument 
for external control through legislation makes more sense. This is 
especially so in circumstances where employers introduce 
noncompetition agreements after an employee has already started 
work.  
 It can also be troubling when employees’ noncompetition 
agreements, come in the “cubewrap” or “click to agree” variety. In 
one case, a court upheld an agreement where the employee clicked 
the “accept” button on a pop-up notification.108 Perhaps these are the 
kinds of cases that move legislators to act on a grand scale, but it is 
not advisable to overreact or attempt to over-correct what may 
otherwise be a workable framework. Legislation that is specifically 
tailored to target certain kinds of conduct to protect particular 
segments of workers deemed most vulnerable might be one approach. 
Another approach might be to require an express written agreement, 
and exclude “clickwrap” agreements as an appropriate format for an 
NCA. The problem could also be left to the courts, wherein the nature 
of such contracts or the conditions under which they were extracted 
might be deemed unreasonable (rather than limiting reasonableness to 
the usual focus on length, geography, and breadth).109  
To the extent those most likely to be harmed by NCAs are low-
level workers (who also tend to be low-wage workers) who do not 
have adequate means and access to counsel, possible reform measures 
tying wage levels to enforcement of noncompetition agreements 
might make sense. As of April 2017, it is expected that some states 
will have moved toward establishing these kinds of limits. For 
instance, in Oregon, a statute adopted effective January 1, 2016, 
requires that an employee’s salary exceed the median family income 
for a family of four in order for a noncompetition agreement to be 
enforceable.110 An Illinois statute prohibits noncompetition 
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agreements with employees earning below thirteen dollars an hour.111 
Reformers in Massachusetts attempted to set wage levels ($130,000 a 
year from a Senate112 proposal and $47,476 per year from the 
House113 proposal) but were unsuccessful. Although earlier 
legislative efforts failed in Washington, new legislation has been 
introduced that would void noncompetition agreement if the amount 
the employee earns is less than $55,000.114  
Another possible reform is to preclude courts from “blue 
penciling” NCAs to make them more reasonable, except perhaps on 
some limited issues. In states where this practice is allowed, an 
incentive is created for employers to overreach because if they do so, 
they know that the likely outcome will be the enforceability of re-
written provisions rather than an outright rejection of their NCAs.115 
Since the enforceability of NCAs are not litigated with respect to 
most employees (except through rare government enforcement 
efforts), allowing blue penciling increases the chilling effect of 
overbroad NCAs and hampers competition and employee mobility. 
Where the concern is about the ability or ease with which private 
plaintiffs can (and must) file civil actions to challenge NCAs, one 
solution, and one that has already been utilized, is possible criminal 
action and investigation through states attorney generals’ offices. For 
instance, the New York Attorney General in June 2016 entered into a 
settlement with Jimmy John’s, whereby the restaurant chain agreed to 
stop including noncompetition agreements in its hiring documents.116 
The practice was determined to be unlawful by the New York 
Attorney General’s office. Franchisees of the Jimmy John’s chain in 
New York had included noncompetition agreements and contracts 
with all employees, preventing them from accepting jobs with 
competitors of Jimmy John’s for two years after leaving the company 
and from working within two miles of a Jimmy John’s store117 “that 
made more than 10% of its revenue from sandwiches.”118 The 
Attorney General deemed this practice “unconscionable” when used 
to limit the mobility and opportunity for minimum-wage workers.119 
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Another notable effort to address the cost of litigation to 
employees might be legislation on the award of attorney’s fees in 
noncompete cases. While some states, such as Florida,120 allow a 
prevailing party to recover attorney’s fees, some may argue that a 
truer balancing considering the perceived uneven balance of power 
between employer and employee would be to provide attorney’s fees 
only to employees if they prevail, and not employers. This view, 
however, is not without limitations, since it may conflict with 
attorney’s fees provisions and statutes in some states that would 
permit either party that prevails to recover attorney’s fees.121 
V. PROPOSED JUDICIAL APPROACHES   
In this Part, we come together to propose a nuanced middle 
ground to encourage courts to engage in a more robust analysis of 
NCAs that is in keeping with the common law and principles of 
equity. We believe that if courts pay as much attention to ensuring 
that a legitimate business interest for a restraint exists as they spend 
considering the reasonableness of the restrictions, most NCA abuses 
will be eliminated. But there are a number of other specific facts that 
courts should consider to determine the reasonableness of NCAs in 
the employment context. 
We start with the premise that the unique nature of trade 
secrets—the fact that they exist only so long as they are not disclosed 
or disclosed in confidence—requires that they be protected against 
accidental, unauthorized, or other improper disclosure. This interest 
must, however, be balanced against public policy in favor of 
employee mobility and other public interests. To that end, we join 
forces to present an analytical framework, and suggest some guiding 
principles that courts faced with the enforceability of NCAs might use 
to guard against their use for anti-competitive and/or abusive 
purposes. 
As noted above, in keeping with common law, the first part of 
the inquiry should focus on the legitimate business interest analysis. 
This examines the nature of the underlying information and whether it 
is already publicly known, including whether the information 
constitutes the general skill and knowledge of the employee. Efforts 
to maintain the confidentiality of the information should also be 
ascertained. The second part of the inquiry, after having determined 
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the existence of “protectable information,” should focus on whether 
the restraint is no more than necessary to protect the employer’s 
interest. As part of this analysis, there should be some showing that 
the employee actually had access to the information and actual or 
potential threat of use in his new employment. To that end, the 
following questions ought to be considered and weighed. 
A. Whether There Are Trade Secrets To Be Protected 
To the extent the employer asserts that there are trade secrets at 
issue, the court can determine if the information is generally known 
or readily ascertainable and whether it has economic value. The 
employer should also be prepared to demonstrate the critical 
component of establishing trade secrecy: that it took reasonable 
efforts to protect the secrecy of the information. If the information at 
issue is confidential information, but does not rise to the level of a 
trade secret, the employer should still demonstrate that it took steps to 
protect the confidentiality of the information. NCAs that purport to 
protect trade secrets and other confidential information as identified 
by the employer should be enforceable under contract law even if the 
information does not meet the “independent economic value” 
requirements of trade secrecy.  
Consistent with common law limitations on the scope of 
protectable information, the information to be protected cannot 
include the general skill and knowledge that is part of the employee’s 
toolkit. Where an employee has worked in an industry for a long time, 
it can be difficult to differentiate between an employee’s general 
knowledge, and the employer’s trade secret information. As one court 
noted: 
Mere “knowledge of the intricacies of a [former employer’s] business 
operation” does not constitute a protectable secret that would justify 
prohibiting the employee from “utilizing his knowledge and talents in this 
area. A contrary holding . . . would make those in charge of operations or 
specialists in certain aspects of an enterprise virtual hostages of their 
employers.”122  
Thus, the court must determine whether the employee’s competitive 
value to the new employer lies in his knowledge of the former 
employer’s trade secrets, or in the employee’s array of general 
knowledge and experience gained from education and prior work in 
the industry.   
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B. Whether the Employee Had Access to the Protected 
Information 
This inquiry focuses on the extent of the employee’s access to 
the protectable information claimed to be protected by the NCA. It 
should be analyzed against the backdrop of the reasonable efforts 
requirement of trade secrecy and the emerging best practice that trade 
secret and confidential information should only be shared on a “need 
to know” basis. The greater the amount of access to and the volume 
of proprietary information specified, the greater the risk to the 
employer that the information might be used inappropriately. Thus, 
inquiry into the nature of the employee’s position with the former 
employer, the nature of the trade secrets or proprietary information at 
stake, and the employee’s role with the new employer would be 
highly relevant. The employer may also wish to demonstrate the 
likely harm that could result from the employee’s access to, and 
potential disclosure of, the proprietary information. 
While reformers have attempted to draw lines around wages and 
executive-level versus nonexecutive-level employees or various types 
of occupations,123 these limits are not always sufficient. There are 
instances, particularly in smaller operations or startups, where a 
person’s salary or title does not appropriately reflect their access to 
and possession of trade secrets. Accordingly, the aforementioned line 
drawing could have gaps and not reach certain types of employees 
who should be covered. Focusing an NCA strategy on who is actually 
given access to critical information is a practical way of solving the 
line drawing problem. It also demonstrates one downside to relying 
on legislation rather than the flexibility of the courts, who can rule on 
a case-by-case basis. 
Consideration should also be given to how the employee 
acquired the subject information. It is a long-standing policy of the 
United States, codified in the UTSA and the DTSA, that the 
acquisition of information through reverse engineering and 
independent development (and more generally, through education and 
personal growth) is a proper means of acquiring information. 
Contractual restrictions that purport to prevent such activities should, 
at a minimum, be evaluated as part of the reasonableness analysis, if 
not banned outright as a means to balance the interests of employers 
and employees.   
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C. Whether There Is Evidence that the Employee Has 
Misappropriated or Threatened To Misappropriate the 
Employer’s Proprietary Information  
The existence of evidence suggesting bad faith or that the 
employee has or will disclose or use the information should weigh 
heavily in favor of enforcing the restraint. In such circumstances 
(particularly if the information at issue is trade secret information), 
the NCA is likely to be a complementary remedy to any 
accompanying counts for trade secret misappropriation. Both the 
UTSA and DTSA provide remedies for actual and threatened 
misappropriation of trade secrets. As such, where evidence of such 
misappropriation exists, the employer’s protectable interest in the 
NCA is further strengthened. The absence of evidence of 
misappropriation does not, however, mean that the agreement should 
not be enforced, but may dictate the type of remedy to be granted. 
Indeed, this is the benefit of a contractual agreement, as long as upon 
consideration of the other principles it is deemed reasonable and 
enforceable. 
D. Whether the NCA, on Its Face, Appears Reasonable in 
Terms of Scope and Duration, in Light of the Nature of the 
Employee’s Duties and Position with the Company 
Scope and duration is typically the current focus of most courts’ 
analysis of NCAs.124 Within our framework, however, emphasis is 
also placed on the conditions under which the agreement was made. 
To the extent the non-competition clause looks like it was arrived at 
after careful deliberation and negotiation, rather than an overbroad 
contract of adhesion, it should be viewed more favorably to the 
employer. This would discourage “click to agree” types of 
agreements. In addition, the inclusion of known unenforceable terms 
in the agreement should weigh heavily against the employer, as this is 
evidence of bad faith and may constitute an act of unfair competition. 
It goes without saying that the sandwich-maker at Jimmy John’s 
is not the kind of employee who should be signing a two-year 
noncompetition agreement.125 However, a proper inquiry into the 
reasonableness of a noncompetition agreement under those 
circumstances should lead to the right outcome. There certainly is 
room for state legislatures to try to address these kinds of blanket and, 
																																								 																				
 124. See discussion infra note 35. 
 125. See Clare O’Connor, Does Jimmy John’s Non-Compete Clause For Sandwich Makers 
Have Legal Legs?, FORBES (Oct. 15, 2014), http://bit.do/JimmyJohnsLegalLegs. 
468 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.   [Vol. 33 
albeit, unreasonable restraints ex post, but we have to be careful not to 
throw out the baby with the bathwater. 
E. Whether the Employer Has Provided Payment for the Period 
of Time that the Employee Will Be Out of Work 
 “Garden leave” agreements where the employer agrees to pay 
the salary of the employee while he sits out for a certain period of 
time before joining the new employer should be encouraged and 
looked upon with favor. These agreements address concerns of 
fairness and equity to the employee, who is seen as prevented from 
earning a living. Whether the payment to sit out is part of the NCA or 
proposed by the employer after initiation of litigation should not 
make a significant difference, and ought to weigh equally in favor of 
the employer. The key is to determine the reasonableness of the 
compensation in light of the period of noncompetition, including any 
reduction in career advancement during any period of inactivity.  
F. Whether the NCA Strikes the Appropriate Balance Between 
the Employee’s Freedom to Work and the Employer’s 
Protection of Its Protectable Business Interests 
Ultimately, evaluation of the above considerations will assist the 
court in deciding whether the NCA is enforceable in light of the 
particular facts and circumstances of the case. As part of that 
determination, the court may consider whether the restraint is the least 
restrictive in light of the nature of the information and the threat 
posed by the employee’s new employment. In other words, there 
should be a direct connection between the type of information to be 
protected and the terms of the restraint. In particular, the shelf-life of 
the information should be considered because in some situations the 
nature of the information could be such that it will no longer be secret 
or competitively sensitive at the time the enforcement of an NCA is 
requested or after a short period of time.126 In those situations, a court 
may lean toward a shorter restrictive period than that provided in the 
agreement.  
After weighing all of the foregoing considerations and general 
principles of equity, and depending on that which is permissible in the 
jurisdiction, the court can determine whether the NCA is enforceable. 
If so, it can choose from a range of options to craft an order that 
reflects the most equitable balance under the circumstances.  
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VI. CONCLUSION   
In this article, we entered the debate about the propriety of 
NCAs through our lens as trade secret scholars. We explored both the 
values and detriments of NCAs, each taking sides in the debate and 
providing relevant information about the different approaches to the 
enforceability of these agreements. Finally, we came together to 
suggest a nuanced middle-ground to encourage courts to engage in a 
more robust analysis that focuses on both the legitimate business 
interest to be protected by the NCA and reasonableness in the scope 
of the agreement. To that end, we recommend consideration of six 
questions to help guide courts in achieving a more equitable and 
balanced outcome to protect the interests of employers and 
employees.  
